Ultrafast physical random bit generation at hundreds of Gb/s rates, with verified randomness, is a crucial ingredient in secure communication and have recently emerged using optics based physical systems. Here we examine the inverse problem and measure the ratio of information bits that can be systematically embedded in a random bit sequence without degrading its certified randomness. These ratios exceed 0.01 in experimentally obtained long random bit sequences. Based on these findings we propose a high-capacity private-key cryptosystem with a finite key length, where the existence as well as the content of the communication is concealed in the random sequence. Our results call for a rethinking of the current quantitative definition of practical classical randomness as well as the measure of randomness generated by quantum methods, which have to include bounds using the proposed inverse information embedding method.
, an implementation on integrated circuits [7, 17] and electronic chaotic elements [18] .
The verification of the randomness produced by any physical RBGs [19] or pseudorandom bit generators is binary quantified by several statistical test suites [20] [21] [22] . The most popular one is the NIST test suite [22] consisting of many local and global tests and typically requires exhaustive examination of a very long random bit sequence of at least 1 Gb.
Successfully passing one or several of these statistical test suites has become the standard certification of acceptable randomness of the sequence being tested and of the method used to generate the sequence. These statistical test suites, however, only provide a fail or pass criterion for the random bit sequence and do not give a quantitative score for the strength of the randomness in the sequence.
Results. -We propose a reverse strategy which aims to quantify the maximal amount of information that can be systematically embedded in a certified random bit sequence using a given test suite, without harming its certification. Using such an inverse strategy, we can quantify the level of randomness and go beyond a binary certification. In addition, since the information is systematically embedded in the bit sequence, this method offers a new type of classified cryptosystem, which is similar to sub-thermal communication. For simplicity, the certification of the randomness of a bit sequence used in this paper is based on the popular NIST test suite only.
The demonstration of the proposed method begins with the generation of a 1 Gb long random bit sequence which successfully passes the NIST test. The data is generated from the digitized (8 bit analogue to digital converter) output intensity fluctuations of a chaotic semiconductor laser using the 3rd derivative of the obtained data and retaining the 5 least significant bits of the derivative value5 ( fig. 1) . The generated sequence is tested by the NIST test suite and thus certified to be random. The 1 Gb long sequence is then partitioned into 1000 blocks of 1 Mb and PD, high-speed photodetector. The post-processing (green) consists of p-bit ADC followed by the nth derivative of the digitized signal and finally the appending of the m-least-significant-bits (LSBs) to the random bit sequence.
each. In the second step, each block of 1 Mb is manipulated by dividing it into successive multiple segments of K+G bits ( fig. 2(a) ). The information is embedded in the last bit (colored red in fig. 2 (b)-(c)) of each segment K (orange), where the region G (blue) indicates the gap between successive segments of length K. In the first embedding scheme we examined, the last bit of each segment K is set to the parity of its previous K-1 bits ( fig. 2 (b))
where + −1 represents the last bit of each segment of length K ( fig. 1(a) ), after the modification of Eq. (1). In a second embedding scheme we examined, + −1 is set to the parity of a subset of its preceding K-1 bits. The limiting case consisting of a subset of only two bits and + resulting in
where m and q are arbitrary integers with a value between 1 and K-1 ( fig. 2(c) ). The implementation of either of these schemes indicates that the last bit of each orange-segment of K-bits ( fig. 2) is not independent and can be uniquely deduced from the preceding K-1 bits. NIST tests was slightly below the expected threshold (proportion = 0.980561). In such events, we first identified the 1 Mb blocks responsible for the failure of the specific test for which the threshold was not reached, using the detailed NIST report.
The number of such blocks is typically in the range of 20 to 40, which is small compared to the total of 1000 blocks ( fig. 3 ).
Next, we implemented the embedding scheme on the original sequence without modifying the few blocks that failed, and this results in a random bit sequence which successfully passes the NIST test ( fig. 3 and see also appendix fig. A1 ).
The fraction of potentially modified bits as a consequence of the realization of the embedding schemes exceeds 0.01 (K ∼ 100) and can even come close to 0.1 (K → 10) ( fig. 3 and see also appendix figs. A1 and A3). Note that the proportion of the NIST test is not monotonically increasing with K and can even move away from the threshold by the implementation of the scheme. Though these bits can be uniquely extracted from the rest of the unmodified bits, the randomness of the entire bit sequence is still verified by the NIST test. Thus, to an outside observer the embedded bit sequence looks statistically identical to the original random bit sequence in spite of the fact that it contains a significant amount of information. The robustness of successfully passing the NIST test was verified for at least eight other random bit sequences of 1 Gb each, as well as for varying G values. In addition, results were found to be robust to the generalization of Eq.
(1) to a random embedding assignment
where _ = 0/1 with equal probability, e.g. compressed data, and similarly for the second embedding scheme, Eq. (2) (see appendix fig. A4 ). Similar results were also obtained for biased statistical prescriptions for _ , e.g. uncompressed data, as well as original random bit sequences generated by a pseudorandom number generator (not shown).
The embedding scheme which determines the last bit in each orange-segment of K-bits can be generalized for any subset of the K-1 bits (see for instance appendix fig. A5 ), hence the number of possible schemes grows exponentially with K
In principle this number can be much enlarged using predefined varying K values and schemes along the sequence.
Alternatively, one can use a fixed K value and predefined varying q values, e.g. eq. (2), along the sequence, which found in some cases to pass the NIST test (not shown). This space of possible schemes serves as a huge key-space for the proposed private-key cryptosystem ( fig. 4 ), in which a predefined key of length O(1), independent of the size of the message, is used at the encoder to cipher a binary message ( fig. 4(a) ). The decoder retrieves the message by reversing the embedding scheme on the received message ( fig. 4(b) ). An eavesdropper, who has full access to the transmitted signal, cannot distinguish between a random transmitted binary signal, containing only random noise, and the ciphered one. Both transmitted signals are interpreted as random sequences which successfully pass the NIST test. An exhaustive search for the concealed message faces the difficulty of guessing the embedding key from the huge key-space, Eq. (4). Conclusion. -The proposed private-key method has the unique feature similar to the class of sub-thermal communication or steganography [23] , where the existence of a meaningful communication is concealed [24] . This goal is achieved using a communication channel [25] that is continuously occupied by the transmission of random bits at arbitrary transmission rates, which are embedded from time to time by a message using an agreed upon embedding scheme, such as Eqs.
(1)- (2) . An observer cannot distinguish the information containing sequence and the random transmission, since both successfully pass the NIST test suite. The capacity of such classified communication is large, since the ratio can exceed 0.01 as K ≲ 100 ( fig. 3 ). In the limit where the rate approaches O(0.1), K below fifty ( fig. 3) , the embedding scheme has to incorporate variation along the sequence in order to achieve a large enough key-space. This allows secure communication to be maintained even against an exhaustive search attack for the embedding scheme used. In cases where the information embedded sequence fails the statistical test as a result of the failure of several blocks, one possible practical solution is to delete the failing blocks and append an equal number of random blocks to the end of the original random bit stream.
The suggested inverse method and its utilization in secure communication is also applicable to test the stability of quantum random bit generators (QRBGs) against injection of information. The generation rates of QRBGs are typically several order of magnitudes below Gb/s [26, 27] , unless a classical post-processing or additional classical sub-processes are concatenated to the original pure quantum fundamental source [28, 29] . In QRBGs the quality of the randomness is assumed to be perfect, as a consequence of the fundamental principles of quantum physics. In practice, this perfect randomness is possibly diminished by many experimental imperfections, such as detector quantum efficiency, for example. Hence, a sequence generated by a QRBG also has to be certified by statistical test suites [26] [27] [28] [29] . Moreover, even assuming that there are no experimental imperfections and that a QRBG is indeed producing ideal random bit sequences, the utilization of these sequences for practical use (e.g. fig. 4 ) requires a certification of their randomness. Therefore, an effective statistical test, which can distinguish between an original quantum guaranteed sequence and spurious sequences, is necessary.
Our method suggests that one can test the strength of the randomness in a string by systematically and gradually adding information to a random sequence generated either by a physical random source or by a QRBG, until the information containing sequence no longer passes the statistical tests, such as NIST. The minimal K value at which this failure sets in (with a given probability, since the transition is not sharp) is suggested as a good indicator of the strength of the randomness.
It is intriguing to consider whether there are other statistical tests that could yield a quantitative measure of the amount of information that can be embedded in certified random bit sequences and whether this quantity differentiates quantum from classical generated sequences.
Appendix: additional data. - 
